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I. INTRODUCTION
This report provides an Executive Summary of the activities which
comprised Study 2. 3, "Analysis of Advanced Programs, " of NASA Contract
NASw-2301. The study originally consisted of three separate subtasks
primarily related to the Space Shuttle,
2.3. 1 - Vehicle Data Reference Base
2. 3.2 - Advanced STS Program Analysis
2. 3.3 - Advanced Development Analysis
Subtask 2. 3.4, "Utilization of Solid Rocket Motors (SRMs) for Space Shuttle,"
was added to the contract on 15 May 1972 to provide SRM data to the Marshall
Space Flight Center (MSFC). A concise description of each significant
activity accomplished under Study 2. 3 is included in this executive summary.
More detailed descriptions are contained in Volume II, "Study Results, " of
the Study 2. 3 Final Report, Aerospace Technical Report No. ATR-73(7313-
01)-1, (Reference 1) and in the documentation developed during the conduct
of Study 2.3 as listed in Table 1 and in References 1 - 6.
The period of performance of Study 2.3 was from 1 October 1971
to 31 August 1972, with the exception of Subtask 2.3.4 which ran only from
mid-May to the end of August. Approximately 48. 9 man months were ex-
pended by Members of the Technical Staff (MTS) on the first three subtasks
and 50.0 man months on Subtask 2. 3.4.
During the first six months of the Study, major emphasis on the
first three subtasks was placed on the analysis of alternate Space Shuttle
configurations, including technical issues, performance, and costs. Once
the Request for Proposal for the NASA Phase C Shuttle contract was issued
in mid-March, emphasis shifted from vehicle-oriented analyses to additional
costing effort in the areas of body/tank structure and aerodynamic surfaces
cost estimating relationships (CERs) and to a new activity to develop addi-
tional cost data for large solid rocket motors. A continuing effort at the
level of approximately one MTS each was expended in support of the Advanced
Development Office (MTG) of the Advanced Missions Directorate, and in
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support of Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) Shuttle costing analyses through
the use of the Aerospace Vehicle Synthesis Program. At the end of June
a very small pilot effort was initiated in support of in-house NASA activities
to develop a program model combining performance and cost factors
applicable to NASA space programs.
Table I-1. Study 2. 3 Documentation*
TITLE
Analysis of Advanced Programs (Study 2.3)
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II. STUDY OBJECTIVES
The overall objective of Study 2. 3 was to provide inputs to the
Director of Advanced Programs (MT) to assist NASA in arriving at pro-
grammatic decisions. In general, these studies supplemented in-house
NASA studies in the same areas and provided additional data to NASA to be
used in reaching conclusions on various issues of concern to NASA at the
time the studies were performed.
The principal objectives of the first three subtasks* were to:
1. Maintain a data bank which related vehicle description, per-
formance, cost, and technical risk for configurations under
review.
2. Update and refine computer programs and methodology used to
estimate program cost implications of space vehicle program
unce rtaintie s.
3. Analyze relative effectiveness of advanced STS programs
identified by NASA.
4. Suggest potential benefits which might be gained either through
novel and imaginative application of vehicle configurations
currently under study or through development of new vehicle
configurations.
5. Advise the Technical Director of the need for any study changes
or additional studies related to NASA Phase B Space Shuttle
effo rt.
6. Identify new concepts and techniques which could significantly
influence advanced mission capabilities.
7. Develop and maintain a descriptive catalog of the identified
development requirements.
The principal objectives of Subtask 2. 3.4 were to:
1. Convey to NASA the USAF/Aerospace experience in large solid
rocket motor development.
2. Apply this experience to specific analysis tasks for the Shuttle
SRMs.
3. Provide, whenever possible, parametric data on SRM designs
which have applicability to analyses being performed by NASA.
* The basic Statement of Work for Study 2.3 is included as Appendix A to
this report.
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III. RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER NASA EFFORTS
To accomplish the overall and specific objectives of Study 2. 3, close
coordination was maintained with both NASA and DOD Space Shuttle activities.
In addition, Government and contractor efforts on other elements, e.g.,
Space Tug, of the Space Transportation System (STS) were followed, but
only to the extent necessary to provide current data as needed in support of
Study 2. 3.
There was a close interaction between Study 2.3 and Study 2. 5,
"Advanced Program Operations/Logistics Analyses, " during the course of
Contract NASw-2301 in that Study 2. 3 provided vehicle data to Study 2. 5 for
DORCA analyses. Interaction also took place to a lesser degree with Study
2.4, "Analysis of Space Tug Operation Techniques, " primarily in the trans-
fer of ELDO-related Tug data to Study 2. 3. Interplay with the other three
studies covered by this contract was not substantial, due to the limited
overlap in the scope of the other three studies with Study 2. 3.
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IV. METHOD OF APPROACH AND PRINCIPAL ASSUMPTIONS
As indicated in the Introduction, Study 2. 3 consisted of four subtasks:
2. 3. 1 - Vehicle Data Reference Base
2. 3.2 - Advanced STS Program Analysis
2. 3.3 - Advanced Development Analysis
2. 3.4 - Utilization of Solid Rocket Motors for Space Shuttle
Emphasis on Subtask 2. 3. 1 was to update and refine computer pro-
grams and methodology used to estimate program cost implications of space
vehicle program uncertainties. The two areas specifically worked during
the Study were the Aerospace Vehicle Synthesis Program and certain of The
Aerospace Corporation cost estimating relationships (CERs) used with the
Aerospace STS Cost Methodology (Reference 2). The Vehicle Synthesis
Program was updated as necessary, to reflect the various Shuttle configura-
tions which were of interest to NASA MSC during the evolution of the Space
Shuttle baseline during the first half of the contract period. The utility of
the Program to MSC was first improved by modifying its format to be more
compatible with the MSC cost format. The Program was subsequently
modified to incorporate dummy MSC CERs so that MSC could generate con-
figuration-dependent Shuttle cost data directly. In the cost area, the Body/
Tank Structure CER and the Aerodynamic Surfaces CER were reanalyzed
using new NASA cost data for the Saturn stages and new data on military
aircraft, respectively.
Subtask 2. 3.2 was intended to provide data to the Office of Manned
Space Flight on the relative effectiveness of advanced STS programs of
interest to NASA; in accomplishing this goal, maximum use was made of
data developed in Subtask 2. 3. 1. For the most part, with the exception of
the IDA Minimum Spacecraft analysis, these analyses were limited to the
NASA Phase B Shuttle configurations and concentrated primarily on various
technical and economic factors which could have an impact on Shuttle
program decisions by the NASA. In general, this subtask was used by the
NASA Program Director (MT) to develop ad hoc data to assist NASA in
its decision-making on the Shuttle program.
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In Subtask 2. 3. 3, The Aerospace Corporation used its insight into
NASA, DOD, and in-house studies to identify new concepts and techniques
which could significantly influence advanced mission capabilities. Since
this activity was to concentrate on "space systems, " rather than on specific
space elements, most of the concepts or techniques identified in this subtask
were of a general nature and could be applied to a variety of space systems.
The data developed in this subtask were submitted to the Advanced Develop-
ment Office (MTS) in a Research and Technology Operating Plans (RTOP)-
compatible format to provide maximum benefit to budgetary planning
activities within NASA.
Subtask 2. 3.4 made use of Aerospace 's experience with large solid
rocket motor development programs to provide useful data and analyses to
MSFC in support of its role as the program manager for the Shuttle SRM
booster program. Past Aerospace, contractor and Air Force data from the
Titan III and 156 in. SRM programs were reviewed and pertinent data were
extracted to provide a point of departure for Aerospace Shuttle-related SRM
analyses such as performance, dynamics, materials selection, and recovery.
To the extent possible, these data were developed parametrically to have
maximum utility to MSFC.
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V. BASIC DATA GENERATED AND SIGNIFICANT RESULTS
A. SUBTASK 2.3. 1 - VEHICLE DATA REFERENCE BASE
1. COST MODEL IMPROVEMENT ACTIVITIES
a. General
The cost model improvement activity was requested by
NASA to correct deficiencies in The Aerospace Corporation STS Cost
Methodology (Reference 2) which was widely available at the start of the
contract period. These deficiencies had arisen either because newer data
had made certain CERs suspect or because cost model changes were
required due to changes in the Shuttle concept, e.g., solid rocket motor
(SRM) boosters instead of flyback boosters. It was hoped that the improve-
ment in The Aerospace Corporation STS Cost Methodology would provide
useful cost data on the STS program. The high priority, key cost model
improvement activities were the completion of the Body/Tank Structure
CER Review and the development of a current SRM Cost Model. Incor-
poration of these two cost model improvements will update the STS Cost
Methodology to the point that it will be applicable to the current Shuttle
configuration. Although not reported in this section, cost support was
also provided in connection with the vehicle configuration assessment
activities discussed under Subtask 2. 3. 2.
b. Body/Tank Structure CER Review
This report (Reference 3) revised the Body/Tank
Structure CER to make use of new Saturn stage cost data which became
available after the original CER was developed in 1970. The new CER for
DDT&E costs indicated that the costs were independent of propellant type
(cryogenic or storable) whereas the original CER varied with propellant type.
The new CER for theoretical first unit (TFU) cost was still a function of
propellant type. The Aerospace DDT&E costs for Body/Tank Structure are
reduced 40% with the new CER but TFU costs increased by 3%. Drop tank
and Tug DDT&E costs will also be decreased based on the new CER.
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c. SRM Cost Model
This report (Reference 4) provided NASA with an addi-
tional data source for SRM costs for the Shuttle. CERs were developed for
the DDT&E, investment, and operations phases of a large SRM suitable for
the Shuttle. The CERs were broken out according to the work breakdown
structure (WBS) used in The Aerospace Corporation STS Cost Methodology.
The major cost item in the DDT&E phase of the SRM program is test hard-
ware since this phase is essentially a demonstration program to qualify the
booster. The key component in the first unit CERs is the case plus insulation
at a cost of approximately $10/lb. Propellant is estimated to cost $0. 34/lb.
d. Aerodynamic Surfaces CER Review
This activity was performed to update the airframe
cost data points, review the methodology, and revise the Aerodynamic
Surface CER. The review indicated that no change was necessary in this CER.
e. Solid Rocket Motor Sizing Program Review
The cost subroutine of an existing Aerospace large
SRM sizing program was examined and exercised by the direction of the
Technical Director at the request of MSFC to estimate the SRM program
costs and to test its applicability. The program was developed in the 19 6 0s
and consists of performance, weight, and costing subroutines. The general
conclusion drawn from this examination was that the program's applicability
to estimate current SRM program costs is uncertain because the price index
for key SRM items is unknown. In addition, the program does not accom-
modate large production rate effects for propellants.
f. Attitude Reference System Study
This study was initiated at the end of June at the request
of the Study 2. 3 NASA Technical Director as a precursor to proposed FY 73
Aerospace Corporation cost performance activities. It was intended to in-
vestigate the problem and determine the weaknesses in the present data base
to support the approaches to be used in FY 73. The study covers only
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attitude reference systems as a small part of the attitude control system.
A brief attempt was made to establish a relationship between system cost
and some system characteristics. Data has been compiled on seven gimbaled
platforms and eight strapdown stabilization units. It has been found particu-
larly difficult to obtain accurate information on cost and reliability and to
correlate these with a single system variable.
2. VEHICLE SYNTEHSIS MODEL
Support was provided to the MSC Shuttle costing activity by
conducting Shuttle performance sensitivity analyses. Efforts were also
made to install the program at MSC for use by NASA personnel. A Program
User's Manual (Reference 5) was prepared, and the content of the program
was expanded and clarified. Cost routines were incorporated to permit the
program to be more directly usable by NASA personnel.
B. SUBTASK 2.3.2 - ADVANCED STS PROGRAM ANALYSIS
1. GENERAL
A series of Shuttle studies were performed utilizing a com-
prehensive vehicle data bank, which was developed and updated from
continuing contractor effort during the NASA Phase B Shuttle Definition
phases as well as from data developed under Subtask 2. 3. 1. These studies
were all performed prior to the 17 March release of the Phase C RFP which
baselined the parallel burn SRM configuration. In most cases, the vehicles
utilized in the assessment activity were predecessors of the RFP baseline
which was finally selected. Some of the later efforts did include the eventual
baseline system as an alternate. The conclusions which were developed
at the time of the study were not revised or reevaluated following the release
of the NASA RFP.
2. IDA MINIMUM SPACECRAFT SHUTTLE CONCEPT REVIEW
At the October 1971 meeting of the President's Scientific
Advisory Committee (PSAC) Space Shuttle Panel, representatives of the
Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) presented a '"ninimum-spacecraft"
9
Shuttle concept which consisted of a reusable first stage, an expendable
second stage, and an optional manned spacecraft/glider for use on manned
missions. Promulgation of this concept was motivated by the consideration
that, if payload retrieval should not prove to be of significant economic ad-
vantage, use of an unmanned vehicle configuration with an expendable upper
stage may be preferred for payload deployment. The manned spacecraft/
glider would be reserved for use on flights requiring manned capability. In
view of the attractiveness of the performance capabilities and costs, both
non-recurring and recurring, attributed to the concept by IDA, The Aerospace
Corporation was directed by the NASA Study 2.3 Technical Director to con-
duct an independent review to substantiate IDA data or to develop an alter-
native set of estimates. The results of this review, were presented at the
November 1971 meeting of the PSAC Space Shuttle Panel.
The following conclusions were reached:
a. Total vehicle size is sensitive to spacecraft and
second stage weight, with the second stage structure
factor being a key driver.
b. For equal design mission payload capability, vehicle
weights derived using the Aerospace weight synthesis
methodology are substantially higher (- 71% GLOW)
than those derived through use of the IDA weight estima-
ting methodology.
c. Both the IDA and Aerospace vehicle configurations
capture all NASA missions; use of the Centaur stage
with the IDA vehicle is higher than with the Aerospace
vehicle.
d. IDA and Aerospace costs estimates for the same
vehicle configuration are comparable.
e. Use of Aerospace weight synthesis techniques leads
to large cost differences.
f. Utility of concept, based upon Aerospace cost and
weight estimating techniques, is extremely marginal.
3. SHUTTLE CONCEPT STAGING VELOCITY STUDY
Various Space Shuttle concepts were under active investigation
during the early months of the extended Phase B studies. Often these con-
cepts were defined according to different ground rules, optimized against
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different parameters, and, in general, could not be compared with each
other on a consistent basis. In order to correct this deficiency, a study
was undertaken to investigate three candidate Space Shuttle configurations
on a consistent basis. The objectives of the study were to determine the
"cost optimum" staging velocity for each concept and compare costs and
other characteristics of the "optimized" candidate systems.
The three candidate Shuttle concepts all consisted of a
LO 2 /RP 1-fueled, heat sink, reusable flyback booster and a reusable orbiter
which met Level 1 payload requirements with 650 fps of on-orbit AV re-
maining for each of four booster staging velocities ranging from 5, 000 to
8, 000 fps. The three orbiter concepts differed in the location and type of
propellant tank, i.e., single end-loaded LH 2 /LO2 drop tank, twin LH 2 drop
tanks, and internal tank. Both GLOW and dry weight are lower for the drop
tank Shuttle systems than for the internal tank orbiter at all staging ve-
locities, and the minimum value of these weight parameters occurs at a
lower staging velocity for the drop tank systems. The variations of cost
and weight with staging velocity are significantly different for the three
Shuttle concepts. Staging velocity for minimum cost is considerably higher
than that for minimum weight. In general, weight is a minimum at the
lowest staging velocity, while cost is a minimum at the highest staging
velocity, based on the STS Cost Methodology (Reference 2).
4. INTACT ABORT SENSITIVITY STUDY
During the same period that the Shuttle staging velocity
sensitivity study was being performed, the intact abort issue involving the
associated gaps and possible closure options became a program concern.
It was also noted that staging velocity variation could be a possible closure
option, especially for the downrange landing gap case, which occurred
approximately 240 sec following lift-off. Therefore, it was recommended
to the Study 2. 3 Technical Director that the staging velocity study be ex-
tended in scope to include abort considerations for the then newly defined
series and parallel burn Shuttle configurations. The study concluded that
the abort gap can be eliminated by means of increasing the emergency
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power level of the orbiter engines (or increasing the normal thrust level)
or, possibly, by increasing the staging velocity. The latter appears to be
undesirable in view of the associated increase in vehicle gross weight.
5. PHASE B EXTERNAL LH 2 TANK SHUTTLE COST
COMPARISON
A comparative cost analysis of the series and parallel burn
Shuttle configurations studied respectively by Grumman/Boeing and McDonnell
Douglas was performed to provide an understanding of costs and to identify
areas of major differences. The vehicle configuration considered in this
study, which was performed as part of the Shuttle Configuration Assessment
Task, was the external LH 2 drop tank orbiter combined with the heat sink
booster. On a total program basis, the Aerospace cost estimates are as
much as 40% and 22% higher than those of G/B and MDAC, respectively.
6. PRESSURE-FED BOOSTER CONFIGURATION ASSESSMENT
The Pressure-Fed Booster (PFB) was a serious Shuttle
system candidate during the early phases of the Phase B study extension.
However, certain questions were raised regarding the technical feasibility,
operational practicality, and economic attractiveness of this recoverable
booster concept. A study was undertaken in response to those concerns to:
(1) review the available data and assess the technical, operational, and
economic aspects of the pressure-fed booster concept and (2) to identify
PFB design problems and areas of technical concern. In this study, PFB
design, operational, and performance characteristics were determined;
design feasibility was assessed; and concept costs were analyzed and com-
pared with those of other Shuttle candidates. Both series and parallel burn
operating modes were considered. Based on the results of this study, it
was concluded that the pressure-fed booster, in either the series or parallel
burn mode, is technically feasible. The areas of technical concern do not
pose any insurmountable problems. However, higher RDT&E and direct
operating costs for the pressure-fed booster than estimated could easily
result from solutions to booster-related design and operational problems
and could reduce the attractiveness of this concept.
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7. SHUTTLE CONFIGURATION ASSESSMENT
During the first half of this contract, significant effort was
expended to provide data to support NASA Headquarters in the examination
and evaluation of alternate Space Shuttle concepts. In most cases, these
study activities were quick reaction in nature and, of necessity, took maxi-
mum advantage of existing analytical tools and available vehicle and program-
matic data. One of the more important of these rapid assessment studies
was performed on the four candidate Space Shuttle vehicles defined by NASA
Headquarters in its TWX of 5 January 1972. Study activities were initiated
upon receipt of the TWX, and results were presented to the NASA Technical
Director on 19 January. The Phase B Shuttle contractor activities were
closely monitored subsequent to the 5 January 1972 contract redirection, and
the results of the study were continually modified and updated. Summary
assessment and evaluation data addressing key issues and critical areas of
the candidate Space Shuttles were provided to NASA Headquarters for use in
the 25 February 1972 STS Committee Meeting.
In summary, the results of this February assessment showed
that the orbiter with a smaller payload capability and bay size was not
significantly cheaper than the baseline orbiter and probably would be proven
not to be cost-effective from the payload/mission capture viewpoint. Con-
clusions with respect to the Shuttle booster are not as clear. The SRM
booster offers the lowest RDT&E cost and provides the highest confidence
of achieving a Shuttle system within the established cost constraints. If
development cost is the critical parameter, then the SRM booster must be
selected in preference to the liquid boosters; however, the liquid systems
offer lower direct operating and total program costs. The SRM booster
must be recovered and reused in order to be cost competitive with the liquid
systems. From a cost standpoint, the series and parallel burn configurations
are nearly comparable. Taking other considerations into account, the less
complex series burn configuration would be preferred for the liquid systems
and the lighter parallel burn configuration for the SRM booster Shuttle.
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8. ORBITER DROP TANK WEIGHT VARIATION EFFECTS
Examination of Shuttle weight data as reported by the three
NASA Phase B Contractors indicated wide variations in the weights of the
various configurations. One of the orbiter components with a large variation
in its reported weight is the expendable liquid hydrogen/liquid oxygen tank.
Since this expendable tank is a large contributor to both system weight and
recurring cost, a study was undertaken to review the contractors' weight
estimates of this component and to determine the trends and sensitivity of
the gross lift-off weight to variations in tank weight.
In light of the wide variations noted in this study, the
growth allowance of 2%0 used in the Phase C RFP is believed to be an in-
sufficient margin. It is felt that the tank growth allowance be increased to
10%, similar to the booster and orbiter. The contractors' suggestion to
oversize the booster propellant tank at the start of design to increase the
Shuttle growth allowance is one logical method to increase the probability
of achieving the specified payload capability.
9. TRAFFIC ACCOMMODATION ANALYSIS
At the request of the NASA Study 2.3 Technical Director,
an analysis was conducted in January 1972 to estimate the percentage of
total payload traffic which could be accommodated by the Shuttle in combina-
tion with various upper stages as specified by NASA. The payload traffic
considered included NASA, non-NASA, and DOD traffic for the period
1979-90. The NASA and non-NASA payload traffic was derived from the
then-current Fleming model, plus "STAR" additions. The DOD traffic
was based on the August 1971 Option B mission/traffic model. The number
of Shuttle flights totaled 722, assuming that payloads were not combined and
excluding manned revisits, which could possibly be combined with payload
deployment/retrieval missions. The vehicle combinations specified by
NASA included the Shuttle operating by itself and in conjunction with the
Agena, Centaur and Tug upper stages.
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The results of the analysis showed that the Shuttle operating
alone accommodates less than one-third of the total traffic (31. 9%), empha-
sizing the need for an upper stage as an integral part of the STS. Addition
of the Agena and Centaur stages operated in the expendable mode permits
accommodation of 78.4% and 90.4%, respectively, of the total traffic. The
Shuttle when operating with the Tug in the recoverable mode accommodates
essentially the same percentage of total traffic (90. 3%) as when operating
with the Centaur stage in the expendable mode. In practice, either the
Centaur in an expendable mode or the reusable Tug can capture the total
traffic models since minor adjustments to one of the DOD payloads, account-
ing for 10% of the traffic, are possible.
10. NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL
As part of a predecessor study to Study 2. 3, an evaluation
was made of the applicability of the Space Shuttle for nuclear waste disposal.
The results of this evaluation were summarized in the Study B Final Report,
(Reference 6). During Study 2. 3, two follow-on tasks were performed: (a)
preparation of a draft Statement of Work for a potential contractor study,
and (b) reconciliation of Aerospace and North American Rockwell (NR)
Shuttle traffic estimates for nuclear waste disposal in the 1980-2000 time
period. The objective of the contractor study was to develop data needed
by NASA and the AEC to assess the comparative attractiveness of nuclear
waste disposal in space relative to other proposed waste disposal or manage-
ment systems. In the proposed Statement of Work, emphasis was placed on
consideration of system safety and economics.
11. HISTORICAL LAUNCH VEHICLE DATA REVIEW
At the request in January 1972 of the NASA Study 2.3 Tech-
nical Director, an effort was made to collect data which would provide
insight into the distribution between actual spacecraft weight and upper stage
weight delivered into low earth orbit by the U.S. over the past decade. The
objective of this effort was to provide guidance based on historical precedent
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in establishing estimates of how much of the projected Shuttle lift capability
is allocable to relatively high cost spacecraft and how much is allocable to
relatively low cost upper stages and propellants.
It was established that no central national data file exists
which provides direct access to the required historical data. As a sub-
stitute, an effort was made to identify on a mission-by-mission basis the
spacecraft weight and the upper stage, if employed. Using these data, where
applicable, the equivalent weight in low earth orbit was calculated. This
method has many uncertainties, but it is better than the previous practice
of crediting the launch vehicle theoretical payload capability as actual
weight delivered into orbit. Weight data were included for civilian launches
only, due to the unavailability of required supporting data for DOD launches.
Over the past decade, the ratio of spacecraft weight to total weight delivered
into low earth orbit was found to be approximately 20% for NASA unmanned
missions, 15% for other unmanned civilian missions, and approximately
18% for NASA manned missions. Year-to-year variances precluded the
establishment of secular trends.
12. TUG IMPLICATIONS OF MARK I/MARK II SHUTTLE
PROGRAM
In support of visits made by Mr. C. Mathews to the European
Space Council and the European Launcher Development Organization in late
October of 1971, an assessment was made of the potential implications of
the Mark I/Mark II Shuttle program on Tug development planning. Two
interim program approaches were considered: (1) use of an expendable
booster with the Mark II or final orbiter configuration (Option No. 1);
and (2) use of a reusable booster with a Mark I or interim orbiter config-
uration (Option No. 2). For each option, two interim program durations
were evaluated: (1) 1979 through mid-1982 (30 months); and (2) 1979 through
1984 (60 months).
Assessment of Option No. 1 indicated that potential payload
capture would be very low. The total number of flights would be low due to
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the high recurring cost of the expendable booster; priority would be given to
Shuttle development flights with air-breathing engines in the cargo bay and
to manned mission flights. The Option No. 2 interim program presented a
more encouraging outlook because of the higher traffic levels possible, i.e.,
up to 50 flights in a 30-month program, and up to 100 flights in a 60-month
program. The actual traffic capture would depend on the Mark I orbiter
payload capability, and on the Tug configuration employed. The operational
Tug could be developed at the outset and used in an off-loaded configuration,
or an interim Tug could be developed using current technology, thereby
permitting the technology freeze date for the operational vehicle to be delayed.
13. ELDO PHASE B COST ESTIMATES
In February 1972, at the request of the NASA Study 2.3
Technical Director, preliminary estimates were made of the tasks which
would be appropriate for an ELDO Tug Phase B study effort and also of the
associated manhours and costs. It was estimated that the systems Phase B
effort would require a total effort of 80 man years per contractor over a
period of 12-15 months. The primary engine effort for the same time period
was estimated to be approximately 70 man years, plus an allocation of the
European equivalent of $1 M US dollars for testing.
C. SUBTASK 2.3.3 - ADVANCED DEVELOPMENT ANALYSIS
The objective of this task was to identify new concepts and tech-
niques which could significantly influence NASA's advanced mission capa-
bilities. It was believed that The Aerospace Corporation's involvement
with DOD programs plus company-sponsored research, in addition to work
performed in support of the NASA, would provide greater insight into
potential advanced development concepts than might normally be possible.
During the course of the study, 37 candidate technology requirements
were identified and transmitted to the NASA Subtask Director, Mr. E. W.
Hall (Code MTG). The transmittals were made in four bimonthly groups,
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starting the fourth month of the contract. The distribution of these technology
requirements by technical area was as follows:
D - Data 3
G - Guidance 1
IR - Infra- re d 1
L - Laser Applications 4
M - Mate rials/Structure s 6
P - Propulsion 2
R - Radiometry 2
S - Shuttle 3
SB - Space Basing 2
T - Tug 13
The titles of the 37 candidate technology requirements are given
below:
1. Large Screen Display of Detailed Documents/Schematics
in Space (D- 1)
2. Long-Life, High-Speed Spaceborne Data Preprocessor (D-2)
3. Voice Input to Computer (D-3)
4. Angles-Only Rendezvous Guidance (G-1)
5. High Resolution Far Infra-Red Observations (IR-1)
6. External Power Sources (L-1)
7. High Efficiency Laser For Space-to-Space Communications
Systems (L-2)
8. Laser Drilling (L-3)
9. Laser Beam Steering Device for Optical Communication
And Ranging Systems (L-4)
10. Lifetime Testing Procedures (M-l)
11. Control or Organic Contaminants (M-3)
12. Survivability (M- 3)
13. Structural Life Prediction (M-4)
14. Composite Structures (M-5)
15. Thermodynamics of Metal Carbides (M-6)
16. Space Propellant Decomposition (P-1)
17. Rocket Plume - Surface Interactions (P-2)
18. High Resolution Millimeter-Wave and Submillimeter Wave
Radiometers and Radar (R-1)
19. 60 GHz Observation Radar for Earth Orbital Space
Stations (R-2)
20. Space Shuttle as a Lunar Rescue Vehicle (S-1)
21. Jet Plume Interaction (S-2)
23. Data Base Requirements for Space-Basing Concepts (SB-1)
24. Zero Gravity Orbital Propellant Transfer Concept (SB-2)
25. Guidance System for Space Vehicles (T-l)
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26. Tug LSI Computer (T-2)
27. Tug Software Requirements (T-3)
28. Laser Radar (T-4)
29. Propellant Thermodynamic Studies for Reusable Space
Tug (T-5)
30. Auxiliary Propulsion System Study for Space Tug (T-6)
31. Oxygen and Hydrogen Turbopumps for Tug Auxiliary
Propulsion System (T-7)
32. Propellant Thermal Conditioning for Tug Auxiliary
Propulsion System (T-8)
33. Reaction Control Thrusters for Space Tug Auxiliary
Propulsion System (T-9)
34. Tug Reusable Cryogenic Insulation (T-10)
35. Tug Main Rocket Engine Critical Components (T-ll)
36. Tug Propellant Oscillation Dynamics (T-12)
37. Tug Propellant Tank Technology (T-13)
D. SUBTASK 2.3.4 - UTILIZATION OF SOLID ROCKET MOTORS FOR
SPACE SHUTTLE
The objectives of this study were to convey to NASA the USAF/
Aerospace experience in large solid rocket motor development, to apply
this experience to specific analysis for the Shuttle SRM, and to provide
parametric and Titan IIIC/D data which are applicable to the Shuttle SRM.
To achieve these objectives, the study plan was organized into the following
subtasks:
1. SRM Design Analysis
2. SRM Parametric Data Development
3. Special Studies
(a) SRM Manrating Considerations
(b) Recovery Systems Concepts
(c) Titan IIIC/D Experience
The baseline Shuttle configuration and weights were supplied by
NASA Marshall Space Flight Center.
1. SOLID ROCKET MOTOR DESIGN ANALYSIS
a. Thrust Negation Response Analysis
This analysis was to determine the loads which will
be experienced by the Shuttle when terminating the thrust of the solid rocket
motors prematurely for the orbiter abort. Experience gained in the Titan III
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program indicated that the thrust negation force could be large enough
that the interface loads and loading on the vehicle may exceed other design
conditions. The tasks included the development of a dynamic model of the
Shuttle, analysis of forcing functions (thrust transients) for two thrust
negation concepts, and the SRM case response analysis in generating case
response loads and SRM/external tank interface loads.
b. SRM Case Structural Design Criteria
The design criteria used for development of the SRM
cases for Titan IIIC and Minuteman III were reviewed. Structural design
criteria of the SRM case for the Space Shuttle were prepared. The criteria
cover major topics such as design requirements, design conditions, and
proof of design which included analyses and tests. The development of the
document was based on Titan IIIC and other systems experience at Aerospace.
The special features of this document were the consideration of reusability,
fracture control and proof test requirements. The proof and design factors
of safety for the solid rocket motor case were established on the basis of
the service life requirement (Number of reuses) of the case and the fracture
toughness and flaw growth rate of the case material. Proof pressure test
after each flight is considered necessary.
c. SRM Case Materials Study
The SRM case materials study started with the
screening of a broad spectrum of possible candidate materials listed below:
Steel: 4340, D6aC, 18Ni and 12Ni maraging,
HP9-4, HY-150, T-1
Aluminum: 2014, 2024, 2219, 6061, 7075
Titanium: 6A1-4V, 5A1-2.5 Sn
These materials were narrowed down to five candi-
date materials (HP 9Ni-4Co, 12Ni, 18Ni, HY150 and D6aC) after consider-
ing the trade-offs of material characteristics such as fracture toughness,
strength, critical flaw size and weight. High cost and high density were
also factors in eliminating some materials. Detailed investigation of the
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five candidate materials was completed. A material matrix table was
prepared considering the following factors for each material; (a) material
properties, (b) design characteristics - factor of safety, fracture mode,
etc., (c) melt process, (d) fabricability - forming, machining, welding,
etc., (e) heat treatment, (f) reusability - corrosion resistance, weld repair,
etc., (g) nondestructive inspection (NDI), and (h) proof test philosophy.
2. SRM PARAMETRIC DATA DEVELOPMENT
a. SRM Design Envelope
This task was to generate SRM design envelopes for
a range of total impulse by a technique employing a third order thrust model
developed in conjunction with the T-IIIC and T-IIIM design efforts. The
performance subroutine of the large SRM sizing program is used to generate
these design envelopes. The design envelope (commonly called pig-pen)
offers a pictorial presentation of the relationship among variables such as
thrust-to-weight ratio, web action time, maximum dynamic pressure (qmax),
payload and the ratio of delivered total impulse prior to qm ax -t-total
impulse. The design envelope will also satisfy vehicle constraints such as
qmax' q at staging, maximum acceleration, etc. By means of thrust-time
curve shaping, the design envelope can be used to define an optimum grain
design in terms of simplicity of manufacture, and provide an optimum SRM
performance for payload improvement or vehicle GLOW reduction.
b. Internal Ballistics
The objective of this task was to demonstrate the trade-
offs involved in establishing the internal ballistics of the SRM including the
effect of length-to-diameter, port-to-throat ratio, slot flow effects and grain
tapers. This effort is derived from the experience gained in the Titan III
program. Parametric ballistic calculations were made for the baseline
3.96 m (156 in.) SRM having a propellant load of 694, 008 kg (1, 530, 000 lb).
Trade-offs were conducted on motor operating pressure, port-to-throat area
ratio, and the number of segments.
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c. Nozzle Design Considerations
The particular consideration for this task was to deter-
mine if experience has shown problems relative to canting the SRM nozzle.
The Titan IIIC/D SRMs have a six deg cant. In addition, because of previous
experience, concern has been shown for aft closure insulation erosion effects.
An evaluation of a large number of solid rocket motors has provided no sub-
stantiation of any nozzle cant problems. Tests have been run for cant angles
as high as 11 deg. However, all the motors considered have, in general,
classical nozzle configurations. If the nozzle is buried deep in the port area,
there may be some concern since flow conditions become difficult to predict
and require extensive testing. Significant results were obtained relative to
aft closure insulation erosion. An analysis of a large amount of test data
has resulted in correlation of erosion rates as a function of several design
factors. Utilizing this approach it is now possible to predict with a reason-
able degree of confidence the degree of insulation required in the aft closure
area near the nozzle.
3. SPECIAL STUDIES
a. SRM Manrating Considerations
Experience has shown that solid rocket motors are
inherently more reliable than liquid rocket engines. This is true for the Titan
III program and should also hold for the Space Shuttle. However, it should
also be recognized that although large SRMs may be more reliable, the exist-
ing failure modes associated with the flight environment tend to result in more
severe consequences than would be expected with liquid engines. For example,
with T-IIIM, only 10% of the ascent abort forcing failures occur during the
SRM flight phase. However, these failures account for 70% of the estimated
crew loss.
The failure modes and their subsequent effects deter-
mined for the Titan III SRM are directly applicable to the Shuttle. Potential
leakage paths exist wherever sections are joined together. Since the O-ring
installation is blind, there is the possibility of undetected damage contributing
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to a leakage path. Further protection is afforded by filling the boot area with
potting compound, contributing to a slight loss in performance due to the in-
creased weight, approximately 295 kg (650 lb). Several alternatives were
investigated early in the SRM development to reduce the burnthrough potential
but were dismissed in favor of stringent controls over the fabrication and
assembly process.
Further study of sensing techniques should be employed
to improve warning time. New development in ultraviolet sensors may be
able to sense impending burnthrough conditions with sufficient warning time
to allow thrust negation to be employed, thereby reducing the chamber pres-
sure such that burnthrough is precluded. This is particularly important in
the region next to the drop tank. Redundant O-rings offer some improvement
in reducing gas leakage but, as blind installations are employed, the potential
exists for undetected damage.
b. Recovery Systems Concepts
Several feasible recovery concepts evolved from a
study of SRMI recovery. All concepts utilize a cluster of parachutes for the
final stage decelerator. The systems vary in the type and deployment of the
initial decelerator. If a low risk approach is favored, combined with the
utilization of devices within the state-of-the-art, an attached inflatable decel-
erator (AID) offers a viable solution. A substantial weight saving can be
obtained if by some, yet undefined, means the SRM is forced into a broadside
entry into the atmosphere. This would allow the deployment of the cluster of
main chutes (by means of a mortar ejected pilot chute) at considerable less
severe conditions than in the first concept.
4. TITAN IIIC/ D EXPERIENCE
The experience gained from developing the Titan III Solid
Rocket Motors was utilized throughout the total study effort. However, there
are five subtasks identified in the Statement of Work which asked for specific
data from the Titan III program. These tasks are discussed below.
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a. Separation Techniques
This task included reviewing all of the Titan III experi-
ence in the area of SRM staging and separation with justification for the final
selection given. The staging sequence is presented along with profiles of the
solid rocket motors as they fall away from the center core. The application
of the Titan III staging and separation experience is implicit. The Shuttle
configuration is very similar to the Titan III configuration with the single
exception that the core engines (orbiter engines) are burning simultaneously
with the solid rocket motors. While this introduces a much different thermo-
dynamic environment in the aft end of the vehicle, the basic staging and
separation concepts should be identical for all practical purposes.
b. Plume Impingement Effects
This task considered the impact of using staging rockets
to affect separation of the large SRMs from the orbiter/drop tank. This effort
is based on the experience gained in the Titan III program. The primary
effects are the particle impingement heating and the impingement pressure.
The two sizes of staging motors were analyzed, a 8, 900 N (2, 000 lb) thrust
motor supplied in the baseline definition, and a 311,360 N (70, 000 lb) thrust
motor subsequently defined. Impingement upon the drop tank appears to
present no serious problem in that sufficient insulation can be provided. The
staging rockets are canted 45 deg from the plane of symmetry and therefore
do not directly impact on the tank. However, the aft rockets do impinge on
the lower surface of the orbiter wing. The results of the 8, 900 N thrust
rockets are not particularly severe although some protection may be required.
However, the 311,360 N thrust motors result in severe heating. In addition,
the impingement pressures exceed 62,224N/m2 (1,300 psf). If these large
motors are used, they will undoubtedly present a severe design problem.
Although proper placement of the rockets could provide some alleviation, there
will probably be little relief because three to four staging rockets are being
considered. There is no location where each can be installed without at least
one impacting on the orbiter or the drop tank. As a result, further consider-
ation should be given to the staging requirements.
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c. Pad Test Environment
In the area of pad test environment, the Titan III experi-
ence with regard to the acoustic environment, thermal environment and
overpressure environment was reviewed for application to the Space Shuttle.
The overpressure design requirements were established by analysis,
particularly as applicable to the flame deflector and exhaust duct. The use of
protective coatings to minimize refurbishment in the launch area is presented
for its direct application to the Space Shuttle.
d. Thrust Vector Alignment
A comprehensive review of the Titan III experience in
the area of thrust vector misalignment was conducted for the primary purpose
of establishing its applicability to the solid rocket motors being used on the
Space Shuttle. It was concluded that the geometric alignment error of the
solid rocket motor nozzle to the vehicle can be reduced to zero for all
practical purposes. This is accomplished by maintaining very small errors
in actual hardware dimensionality and by further adjustments of the solid
rocket motor and vehicle alignments on the launch pad. The error of the
geometric thrust alignment, as compared to the actual thrust vector align-
ment, is somewhat questionable. There is some indication that the gas
dynamic effects may introduce an error into the actual thrust vector. No
conclusive evidence was established on Titan III, primarily because thrust
vector control was available to compensate for such an error. It is
recommended that this effort be pursued in the Shuttle application to get a
better understanding of the actual thrust vector. Another of the thrust mis-
alignment considerations is the differential thrust error as determined by the
variations in motor-to-motor ballistics. Considerable data has been
evaluated to establish realistic maximum thrust differentials between motor
pairs.
e. Vendor Survey
A vendor survey was conducted to determine the availa-
bility of solid rocket motor components in the 156 in. size and larger. A
review was conducted of Titan III vendor history and the problems encountered
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to determine application to the Shuttle solid rocket motor; a listing of potential
vendors for the Shuttle solid rocket motor was developed. The overall con-
clusions indicate that qualified vendors are available for all large SRM
components. While potential problems do exist, they do not appear severe,
but time should be allowed for vendor qualification. New tooling and/or
additional facilities will be required as a function of motor size and rate.
Additional in-depth studies should be conducted to evaluate motor sizes larger
than can be conventionally transported in addition to further studies relative to
high production rates.
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VI. STUDY LIMITATIONS
The Aerospace Corporation STS Cost Methodology (Reference 2) was
used extensively throughout the Study 2.3 effort and exerted a major influence
on the conclusions reached in the various study activities. This methodology,
developed in FY 1970 under joint DOD/NASA funding, is based on the concept
that the cost of a space vehicle and its parts can be shown to be a function of
one or more design, performance, or program variables. The credibility
and accuracy of any estimate derived through use of the methodology are
necessarily functions of the appropriateness of the correlation of costs to
the independent variable(s) and the quality of the data upon which the estimate
is based.
The cost methodology presently utilizes cost estimating relationships
(CERs) which relate costs principally to system and subsystem weights,
although there are some major exceptions, e.g., main propulsion. The
appropriateness of weight as the major independent variable is open to
question in certain of the subsystem areas, e.g., avionics, command and
control, etc., although more appropriate independent variables are not
immediately apparent. Continued development of the methodology in these
areas is clearly in order.
Many of the study activities reported in this summary were quick
reaction in nature and took advantage of existing vehicle and programmatic
data. In some cases, these data were not entirely self-consistent and may
have yielded study results which would be modified by a more comprehensive
study program. It is not expected, however, that the principal conclusions
drawn in the various study activities would be materially altered.
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VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH
The activities reported herein were oriented primarily towards
systems analysis and did not investigate research opportunities, per se.
However, the potential for research was noted in two areas: (a) cost
estimating methodologies and (b) advanced development concepts.
The various Study 2.3 activities have reconfirmed the often-made
point that cost data are of equal importance to technical data in the formu-
lation of major space program decisions. However, historically the re-
sources expended to insure that the cost data are credible have been only a
small fraction of the resources expended in the technical areas. A com-
prehensive cost data research program which identifies, relationalizes,
and correlates space-related cost data would yield substantial benefits in
future program planning.
Thirty-seven potential candidates for advanced development were
identified under Subtask 2. 3. 3, Advanced Development Analysis. Any of
these candidates which are found worthy of further effort by NASA would
entail either research or development or, in some cases, both. Because
of the diversified nature of these candidate concepts, no specific comments
can be made regarding specific research and/or development activities
which should be pursued by NASA.
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VIII. SUGGESTED ADDITIONAL EFFORT
The most important area in which additional effort is suggested is
the continued refinement and enhancement of the planning tools used in
Study 2.3. These tools comprise principally The Aerospace Corporation
STS Cost Methodology and, to a lesser extent, The Aerospace Corporation
Weight Synthesis Computer Program. As noted in the Section VI discussion
of cost methodology, a closer relationship is needed between the independent
variable used for subsystem cost estimating and the principal subsystem
function. In addition, the data base from which the Cost Estimating Rela-
tionships are derived should be updated and expanded to include all applicable
experience, especially in the area of solid rocket motors (SRMs).
29
IX. APPENDIX A
STUDY 2.3 STATEMENT OF WORK
2.3 ANALYSIS OF ADVANCED PROGRAMS
2. 3. 1 Vehicle Data Reference Base
The contractor shall build on the information developed
under paragraph 2. 1 above and shall maintain a data bank which relates
vehicle descriptions, performance, cost, and technical risk for configura-
tions under review.
The contractor shall update and refine computer programs
and methodology used by him to estimate program cost implications of space
vehicle program uncertainties. Specifically included are the contractor's
vehicle synthesis program and his cost estimating program, both of which
were developed under DOD/NASA funding in previous years.
The vehicle synthesis program shall be modified to be more
specifically adapted to current Space Shuttle configurations which involve new
stage concepts and greater use of expendable stages and hardware than had
been anticipated when the model was formulated. Specifically to be included
are the capabilities to assess drop tank orbiter vehicles, orbiter vehicles
employing expendable thermal protection systems, Mark I/Mark II orbiter
vehicles, heat-sink boosters, non-flyback recoverable boosters, and pres-
sure-fed boosters, both single and dual. The contractor shall also modify
the output format of the vehicle synthesis program to be more compatible
with the data input format requirements of the NASA-MSC costing program.
In addition, the contractor shall refine and update weight estimating rela-
tionships developed in the vehicle synthesis program to be more responsive
to variations in total vehicle weight and size. Of specific interest are the
weight estimating relationships related to the subsystems such as the
hydraulic and the electrical subsystems, including power, power distribution,
and auxiliary power units. The specific schedule for accomplishment of the
modifications identified above shall be coordinated with the NASA Technical
Director and with NASA-MSC personnel as specified by the Technical
Director.
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The cost estimating program shall be updated to reflect the
results of recently completed NASA-sponsored vehicle data studies. The
contractor shall review the results of the data studies and compare these
results with the data used in the initial formulation of the contractor's cost
estimating relationships (CERs). Where differences exist, the contractor
shall (a) update the CER in question or (b) develop a rationale as to why the
CER should not be updated in view of the later data. Of immediate concern
are the contractor's CERs pertaining to body and tank structure and aero-
dynamic surfaces. The contractor shall also review his CERs related to
spares, subsystems and current support equipment and identify corrective
actions.
2. 3.2 Advanced STS Program Analysis
Using the data compiled under paragraph 2. 3. 1 above, the
contractor shall analyze the relative effectiveness of advanced STS programs
identified by NASA. The effort shall include consolidation of technical,
economic and programmatic factors, such as development schedules, growth
potential, and sensitivity to program changes. The contractor shall include
analysis of the impact of the alternative programs on DOD mission and pro-
gram objectives. In addition, the contractor shall analyze the impact of DOD
plans on NASA programs.
This analysis of advanced STS programs will suggest poten-
tial benefits which might be gained either through novel and imaginative
application of vehicle configurations presently under study or through
development of new vehicle configurations. The contractor shall conduct
conceptual design/analysis activities in sufficient depth to establish first-
order verification of the hypothesized program benefit and to report to NASA
the resulting vehicle implications.
During the conduct of the vehicle and program analyses under
this contract the contractor will encounter technical or economic uncer-
tainties which require the conduct of advanced program studies for resolution.
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The contractor shall define the nature of the problem area and shall
prepare supporting documentation to define and describe the required study
effo rt.
The contractor shall advise the Technical Director of the
need for recommended study changes or for additional studies by letter as
soon as these needs are identified. The contractor shall provide to the
Technical Director a program assessment thirty days after each of three
major program milestones and in his final report. These milestones and
their currently scheduled data of accomplishment are: (a) vehicle configura-
tion selection - 15 December 1971; (b) final contractor data dump - 28
February 1972; and (c) RFQ release - 1 June 1972.
2. 3. 3 Advanced Development Analysis
During the conduct of STS-related studies at The Aerospace
Corporation that relate to both NASA and DOD new concepts and techniques
are identified which could significantly influence advanced mission capa-
bilities. In many cases evaluation and exploitation of the full potential
of these new concepts and techniques requires the conduct of advanced
development programs.
The objective of this activity is to develop and maintain a
descriptive catalog of the identified development requirements. Primary
emphasis shall be placed on "space systems, " i.e., those space development
activities which are applicable to multiple programs and not assignable as
unique to, for instance, Space Shuttle development requirements. Typical
examples of this category of tasks are aerobraking, energy storage systems,
special laser developments, lunar surface oxygen production and storage,
abort and rescue systems, liquid transfer, etc.
The content of current related OART advanced technology
programs, OMSF advanced studies and on-going programs and, where
security regulations permit, DOD programs shall be reviewed and evaluated
for applicability to the candidate development requirements. Based on this
review, technical summaries shall be prepared which describe where
future OMSF development activities could be applied to contribute to the
advancement of "space systems" concepts and techniques. These technical
summaries shall be prepared in a format which is compatible with Research
and Technology Operating Plans (RTOP) requirements and shall be submitted
to provide maximum benefit to budgetary planning activities.
The contractor shall review with NASA-Headquarters
personnel as identified by the Technical Director the current content of his
catalog of advanced development opportunities and shall identify those of
particular interest every two months, commencing in the fourth month of
the study.
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